Sherman v. Lloyd and Mutual Selection in California Limited Partnership Law by Means, George M.
Comments
SHERMAN v. LLOYD AND "MUTUAL SELECTION"
IN CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LAW
When is a limited partnership's existence in doubt? According to
the California Court of Appeal in Sherman v. Lloyd, no limited
partnership exists unless the limited partners have "muiually se-
lected" each other for admission into the limited partnership. This
Comment criticizes this recent twist in limited partnership doc-
trine, arguing from both a practical and an analytical standpoint
that "mutual selection" has no place in California law.
INTRODUCTION
The limited partnership is a widely used and accepted form of
business organization.' From its statutory beginnings2 it has evolved
into a tool by which large blocks of investors can take advantage of
1. Comment, Limited Partnerships and the California Securities Law: Restrict-
ing the Public Sale of Limited Partnership Interests, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 618 (1980).
2. The limited partnership was "not recognized at common law and is strictly a
creature of statute." Evans v. Galardi, 16 Cal. 3d 300, 305, 546 P.2d 313, 317, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 25, 29 (1976). It has existed on the European continent since medieval times but
was first established in the United States in New York in 1822. Hrusoff & Cazares,
Formation of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 87 n.l (1970); see gen-
erally Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 329-31 (N.Y. 1850) (explaining history of limited
partnership from origins in statutes of Pisa and Florence in 1166 to the French Code,
from which New York adopted the arrangement). Limited partnerships were recognized
in California specifically when the state adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1929.
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its particular tax benefits3 and favorable liability limitation.4 Limited
partnerships are used in a plethora of settings. Real estate invest-
ment is a notable example. Other areas include oil and gas explora-
tion, cattle and agricultural production and motion picture financ-
ing.5 Most recently, the research and development partnership has
emerged as a valuable tool for financing entrepreneurial efforts in
high technology industries.'
Limited partnerships must be formed according to statutory
guidelines.7 California law provides that if otherwise in compliance
with the statutes, a limited partnership comes into existence when
the certificate of limited partnership is filed with the Secretary of
State's office.8 The statutes do not specify any duty or right of the
limited partners to approve each others' admission into the partner-
ship during its formation. 9 Such a requirement would be inconsistent
3. Hrusoff & Cazares, supra note 2, at 96. Unlike corporations, limited partner-
ships are not taxpaying entities. The partnership itself is not subject to tax on its income.
It is a "conduit" for tax purposes. Each partner's personal tax return must reflect his
distributive share of any profits realized by the business. The corporate entity, on the
other hand, is subject to income tax, and the shareholders also are subject to tax on
income distributed to them by the corporation. C. FRIEDMAN, CHOICE OF BUSINESS EN-
TITY 38 (1983).
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, partnership losses could be used to reduce each
partner's personal taxable income according to each partner's share. At present, limited
partnership losses generally may be used only to offset income from that activity or other
"passive" activities (with exceptions pursuant to phase-in rules). The losses may.not be
deducted from other taxable income. I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632 (Deering Supp. 1987) states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), a limited partner is not liable for
any obligation of a limited partnership unless named as a general partner in
the certificate or, in addition to the exercise of the rights and powers of a lim-
ited partner, the limited partner participates in the control of the business. If a
limited partner participates in the control of the business without being named
as a general partner, that partner is nevertheless not liable to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership unless they do so with actual
knowledge of that partner's participation in control and reasonably believing
that partner to be a general partner.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 15501, superseded by the above section in 1984, but still applica-
ble to partnerships entered into prior to July 1, 1984, stated it more succinctly: "The
limited partners as such shall not bound by the obligations of the partnership." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15501 (Deering 1979).
5. B. LANE & D. FALK. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS
OF ORGANIZATION, OPERATION, AND DISSOLUTION A-3 (1981).
6. See generally L. PETILLON & R. HULL, R & D PARTNERSHIPS: STRUCTURING
THE TRANSACTION 5-10 (1984).
7. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15621-28 (Deering Supp. 1987). See CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 15501-15502 (Deering 1979). See also Hrusoff & Cazares, supra note 2, at 89-90.
8. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15621(b) (Deering Supp. 1987). The code states that
"for all purposes, a copy of the certificate of limited partnership duly certified by the
Secretary of State is conclusive evidence of the formation of a limited partnership and
prima facie evidence of its existence." CAL. CORP. CODE § 15621(c) (Deering Supp.
1987).
9. The written partnership agreement is the primary repository of the limited
and general partners' rights and duties under California law. Unlike the 1984 California
Revised Limited Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not require
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with the reality of large public limited partnerships.', Moreover,
with regard to the admission of additional limited partners, the stat-
ute requires the consent of all existing limited partners only if the
partnership agreement does not provide otherwise."
There seems to be no legal impediment to the formation of a lim-
ited partnership if the statutory requirements are met. The statutes
do not mandate the partners' mutual approval of admission into the
partnership. Further, the California Corporations Code, in effect,
states that a partnership agreement can provide for admission of ad-
ditional partners without the limited partners' consent. 2 Compliance
with the partnership agreement and statutes would appear to satisfy
California law regarding formation and operation of limited partner-
ships without hindrance.
Unfortunately, one legal roadblock does seem to exist. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal for the Second District decided Sherman v.
Lloyd'3 on May 28, 1986. Sherman revived a long-dormant doctrine,
not followed since 1966, concerning the nature of limited partner-
ships.1 4 The doctrine essentially states that a limited partnership is
not bona fide unless all limited partners mutually select each other
as partners:15 Sherman appears to stand opposite both statutory law
execution of a partnership agreement other than the certificate of limited partnership. 2
BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 700.03(2) (R. Clark 4th
ed. 1987).
10. "California was slow to recognize public limited partnerships ... For many
years [the] Commissioner of Corporations actively discouraged the use of large limited
partnerships, except for private offerings to sophisticated investors. With the promulga-
tion of the regulations under the Corporate Securities Act of 1968, the policy was re-
versed, making possible the creation of publicly held limited partnerships." Hrusoff &
Cazares, supra note 2, at 88. Large limited partnerships are commonplace today. R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 253 (4th ed. 1977).
II. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1563 1(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1987) states:
(a) After the filing of a certificate referred to in Section 15621, a person
may become a limited partner:
(1) In the case of a person acquiring a limited partnership interest directly
from the limited partnership, upon the compliance with the partnership agree-
ment or, if the partnership agreement does not so provide, upon the written
consent of all the partners.
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15631(a) (Deering Supp. 1987). Prior to July 1, 1984,
admission of an additional limited partner was accomplished by simply amending the
certificate of limited partnership. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15508, 15525, 15525.5 (Deering
1979).
13. 181 Cal. App. 3d 693, 226 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1986).
14. Until Sherman v. Lloyd, the mutual selection doctrine was last followed in
Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966).
15. Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 501. Delectus personae,
or mutual selection of all partners, is a principle applicable to the formation of general
partnerships under Corporations Code section 15018(g). That section states that "no per-
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and current limited partnership practice.
Sherman's "mutual selection" doctrine poses a serious problem.
Current practice and statutory law do not provide for mutual selec-
tion of limited partners. But, if Sherman is followed, the potential
exists for finding that no true limited partnership existed where the
statutory law indicates it did exist. Attorneys may have difficulty ad-
vising clients regarding the formation of limited partnerships. Fur-
ther, although the mutual selection doctrine has been followed in but
a single district in California, that district includes Los Angeles, the
second most populous metropolitan area in the nation."6 Under Sher-
man, a true limited partnership in San Francisco may not be bona
fide in Los Angeles.
17
This Comment addresses Sherman and its mutual selection doc-
trine and examines the doctrine's origin, theoretical basis and vital-
ity. The Comment explores the legal and practical arguments
against mutual selection. Finally, the Comment urges California
courts to discard the mutual selection doctrine because of its lack of
legal soundness and its potential harmful effects on limited partner-
ship law and practice.
THE MUTUAL SELECTION DOCTRINE
Sherman v. Lloyd: Rivlin Resurrected
Sherman was a limited partner in ML-Airport Properties, Ltd.
(ML). Sherman did not receive his guaranteed eight percent return
son can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15018(g) (Deering 1979). See generally Comment, Are Limited Partner-
ship Interests Securities? A Different Conclusion Under the California Limited Partner-
ship Act, 18 PAC. L.J. 125, 147-49 (1986) (discussing delectus personae as it pertains to
general partnerships). Neither California law, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act nor
the Revised Limited Partnership Act incorporate a similar delectus personae provision as
a requirement. Sherman adopts the concept of mutual selection as a prerequisite to lim-
ited partnership formation.
One commentator suggested in 1938 a watered-down version of delectus personae-
majority, rather than mutual selection-as an incident to limited partnerships. J. CRANE.
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 199-200 (2d ed. 1952).
16. The Los Angeles metropolitan area, including the Riverside and Anaheim ar-
eas, ranks second to the New York metropolitan area in terms of overall population.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK
1986 L & 41 (1986).
17. A hypothetical situation: The Acme Real Estate Investors Limited Partner-
ship is comprised of 200 limited partners and four general partners. The limited partner-
ship agreement provided for the general partners' determination of who would be admit-
ted as limited partners, up to the subscription limit of 2000 shares or 200 investors. None
of the limited partners has met any other limited partner nor has consented to the others'
admission. Provided that all statutory requirements are met, such a limited partnership
would be recognized as bona fide throughout California. But the mutual selection doc-
trine could enable, for instance, a disgruntled investor to seek rescission of the limited
partnership agreement on the basis that no mutual selection took place. Conceivably, a
court applying Sherman could reach that same result.
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on his investment. Upon an attorney's advice that the partnerships'
two-tier structure (discussed below) did not comply with California
law, Sherman rescinded his agreement and sought restitution. After
being denied restitution, Sherman sued the limited partnership, gen-
eral partners and shareholders of the general partners.
Under California corporations law, because an interest in a lim-
ited partnership is a security, as discussed below, its sale must be
qualified according to Corporations Code section 25110. s1 ML's gen-
eral partners had failed to qualify the limited partnership interests as
securities.19 Instead, ML's general partners sought to apply Califor-
nia's safe harbor rule, 0 exempting limited partnerships with ten or
less investors from having to qualify their interests as securities. ML
had more than ten investors. Consequently, ML's general partners
created a second limited partnership, Stapleton, Ltd. (Stapleton).
ML invested all of its funds in Stapleton. In fact, ML had been
formed for the specific purpose of investing in Stapleton. Stapleton
used the money to purchase a building in Denver. The arrangement
reduced the number of partners in both ML and Stapleton to within
the safe harbor rule's limits by splitting the investors between the
two partnerships. Thus, the limited partnerships, each having ten or
fewer investors, ostensibly would be exempt from qualification."
In a summary judgment motion, however, the trial court granted
Sherman restitution because, in essence, the two-partnership attempt
to fall within the safe harbor rule was a sham. The defendants ap-
pealed. The appellate court held that no triable issue of fact existed
as to whether the issuance of the limited partnership interests was
exempt from qualification 22  under Corporations Code section
25102(f),3 exempting bona fide limited partnership interests from
18. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (Deering 1979). Failure to properly qualify a se-
curity not otherwise exempted under section 25102 is punishable by a fine of no more
than $10,000 or one year imprisonment or both. If the violator proves he had no knowl-
edge of the rule he may not be imprisoned. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (Deering 1979).
Sherman involved no question of criminal liability.
19. Sherman, 181 Cal. App. at 693, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
20. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R.260.102.2 (1985).
21. Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 696-700, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 497-99.
22. Id. at 700, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
23. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(0 (Deering 1979) stated in pertinent part:
The following transactions are exempted from the provisions of section
25110:
(0 Any offer or sale, in a transaction not involving any public offering, of
any bona fide general partnership, joint venture or limited partnership interest
This section was modified in 1981. See infra note 85.
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qualification as securities. The court held that the partnership ar-
rangement in the case was not a bona fide limited partnership. Thus
the exemption was not applicable.24
The court explicitly stated that the partnership was not bona fide
because there was "no mutual selection of members in [the] partner-
ship."2 5 In reaching its conclusion the court cited Rivlin v. Levine20
for the proposition that a critical factor in determining whether a
limited partnership is a true limited partnership27 is the element of
mutual selection. Sherman thus awakened a doctrine asleep since
1966 when the California Court of Appeal last applied the mutual
selection criterion in Solomont v. Polk Development Company.2 s
Solomont involved a limited partnership that suffered from a vari-
ety of statutory defects. Any of the defects alone would have sup-
ported the conclusion that no limited partnership existed. 29 But the
court found the mutual selection test determinative. It put its impri-
matur on mutual selection by stating that the doctrine was "declara-
tive of established partnership law" and requisite to the formation of
a limited partnership.
30
Sherman, like Solomont, could have rested on grounds other than
mutual selection. The foremost ground was the attempt to come
under the ten-investor limitation of the safe harbor rule.31 The court
stated that the two separate partnership offerings should be viewed
as integrated into one offering.32 The number of investors would then
exceed the rule's limit3 3 and constitute a public offering requiring
qualification. However, the Sherman court did not pursue the public
offering argument. Instead, it used integration to buttress its conclu-
sion regarding lack of mutual selection. It noted that Sherman had
no relationship with the partners of Stapleton and mutual selection
therefore was impossible.3a
24. Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
25. Id. at 701, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
26. 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961).
27. This Comment uses "bona fide limited partnership" and "true limited part-
nership" interchangeably. If one uses Black's definition, "bona fide limited partnership"
means a true, genuine, actual, real limited partnership. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223
(4th ed. 1951). Dahlquist, whose article may have begun the whole problem (see infra
text beginning at note 38) used the terms "true" partnership and "bona fide" partnership
interchangeably. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corpo-
rate Securities Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 363 (1945). See also infra notes 91 and 97.
28. 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966).
29. Id. at 494-95, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
30. Id. at 497, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 28. But cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15621-15628;
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15501-02 (statutory criteria for limited partnership formation).
31. CAL ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R.260.102.2.
32. Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 701-702, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
33. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R.260.102.2.
34. The court stated:
Given integration, our conclusion ML was not a bona fide partnership is even
more apparent. Prior to executing the ML partnership agreement, Sherman
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To understand Sherman and its holding that a partnership in fact
never existed because mutual selection did not exist, the doctrine's
genesis must be examined. That genesis is in Rivlin and a forty-two
year old law review article3 5  from which Rivlin erroneously
originated its theory.
Rivlin v. Levine
Rivlin involved "an action to recover amount paid for an interest
• ..in a purported limited partnership." 6 The "purported" limited
partnership suffered from a variety of statutory defects, including
failure to open a bank account, failure to do anything as a partner-
ship, and failure to execute a limited partnership agreement.37
Despite the numerous defects in the "purported" partnership, the
Rivlin court chose to rest its conclusion on another basis. The court
appropriated portions of an article by T.W. Dahlquist 38 and formu-
lated the mutual selection doctrine, against which the partnership
arrangement was compared and found wanting. Rivlin quoted the
following:
It is believed that one of the chief criteria for determining whether an inter-
est in a partnership is a "security" under the Act is the element of selection
of the partners.39 In all general partnerships, and also in bona fide limited
partnerships, there is the right of delectus personarum, the right to deter-
mine membership. No partner is admitted without unanimous approval of
every other partner. A true partnership is a relation of personal confidence
and is a select closed group.
40
knew none of [Stapleton's] partners ... except Lloyd and had no pre-existing
relationship with the other partners. Only Lloyd was a partner in both partner-
ships. Moreover, it can be inferred that the limited partners in ML had no
knowledge as to the limited partners in Stapleton.
Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (emphasis in original).
35. See Dahlquist, supra note 27.
36. Rivlin, 195 Cal. App. 2d at 14, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
37. Id. at 15-19, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 589-91.
38. Dahlquist, supra note 27. Dahlquist was a well-respected California lawyer,
considered an authority on the then-existing California corporate securities law. Letter
from Richard W. Jennings to Homer Kripke (July 29, 1986) (discussing Rivlin) (on file
with San Diego Law Review); see infra note 91.
39. Dahlquist's discussion focuses on whether a particular interest is a security or
not. The idea is developed more fully infra at text accompanying notes 42-46.
40. Rivlin, 195 Cal. App. 2d at 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 (quoting Dahlquist,
supra note 27, at 363); Sherman, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 700-701, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 500;
see also Comment, supra note 1, at 643 n.142. The Dahlquist quote also stated that
additional limited partners could be admitted but only by amending the certificate of
limited partnership, signed and sworn to by all partners.
Hrusoff and Cazares noted that the requirement that all partners sign the amended
certificate became an "impossible burden" with the advent of large limited partnerships.
Hrusoff & Cazares, supra note 2, at 95. Dahlquist's statement may have been valid in
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Rivlin interpreted Dahlquist to say that no true partnership, gen-
eral or limited, was formed absent mutual selection.4 1 Whether Riv-
lin correctly interpreted Dahlquist's intent or whether Dahlquist's
article actually supports Rivlin's theory is questionable.
DAHLQUIST'S ARTICLE EXAMINED
Dahlquist's article dealt primarily with regulation and civil liabil-
ity under the California Corporate Securities Act.42 In the context of
regulation, the article examined what constituted a security.43 Dahl-
quist pointed out that the then-current administrative interpretation
considered general and limited partnership interests not to be securi-
ties.44 The Division of Corporations had steadfastly maintained its
position that bona fide partnership interests were not securities. 45
The article concluded that bona fide partnership and limited partner-
ship interests were not securities."
In addition to administrative interpretation, Dahlquist rested his
conclusion on the element of member selection. He cited no author-
ity for the proposition. He remarked that "it is believed" that mutual
selection is a chief criterion for determining whether a partnership
interest is a security.47 The reasoning behind mutual selection as
such a criterion is apparent.
Securities laws were promulgated primarily to protect investors
from fraud.48 Indiscriminate public offerings of investment interests
are the type of transactions condemned by the courts.49 As long as a
partnership retains mutual selection and lack of free assignability, no
need exists to protect the public from indiscriminate, random offer-
ings. Therefore, since no need exists for securities regulation of lim-
ited partnership interests (as Dahlquist defines them), they should
not be classified as securities.
Dahlquist thus differentiated between true partnership interests
1945 and perhaps in 1966, but in 1967 the statutes were amended to provide that if the
partnership certificate permits and the partnership has 25 or more limited partners, only
the selling limited partner, substituted limited partner and general partner need sign the
amended certificate. Id. Current law does not require amendment of the certificate at all.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 15631(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1987).
41. Rivlin, 195 Cal. App. 2d at 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
42. Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 343. The article examined the Corporate Securi-
ties Act of 1917. Corporate Securities Act, ch. 532, 1917 Cal. Stat. 673.
43. Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 356.
44. Id. at 361.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 365.
47. Id. at 363.
48. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1916); People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d
765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951); Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Management, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 382, 387, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533-34 (1961).
49. Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 360; see People v. Simonsen, 64 Cal. App. 97,
220 P. 442 (1923).
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and securities. Rivlin took Dahlquist to say that mutual selection
was a prerequisite to the formation of a true partnership.50 Dahlquist
said no more than an interest in a partnership in which mutual selec-
tion exists should not be classified as a security.5' He did not state
that a bona fide limited partnership could not exist absent mutual
selection. His discussion was based on the concept that limited part-
nership interests do not constitute securities interests, a concept that
was under attack at the time he wrote"2 and which now is considered
obsolete.
Limited Partnership Interests as Securities
California Corporations Code section 25019 enumerates what con-
stitutes a "security" for securities law purposes. 53 Limited partner-
ship interests are not explicitly listed within that section. 54 But cur-
50. 195 Cal. App. 2d at 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
51. See Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 361, 363, 365.
52. In 1944 Herbert Smith, Executive Deputy Commissioner of Corporations,
contended that the Corporate Securities Act could cover bona fide limited partnership
interests. He wrote an article which examined case law illustrating occurrences of permit
requirements for partnership interest issuances beginning with People v. Simonsen, 64
Cal. App. 97, 220 P. 442 (1923). Simonsen did not address the mutual selection crite-
rion. See Smith, Limited Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Corporate Secur-
ities Act, April L.A.B. BULL. 257 (1944); Note, Sale of Limited Partnership Interests:
Rivlin v. Levine, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 176 (1962).
Dahlquist dismissed Smith's contention on the grounds that it did "not purport to be
an official ruling of the Division of Corporations" and that the cases Smith cited were
distinguishable. Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 361. Dahlquist relied on tradition up to
1945 and failed to foresee the trend toward defining certain limited partnership interests
as securities.
53. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deering Supp. 1987) states, in pertinent part:
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; membership in an incorpo-
rated or unincorporated association; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness;
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collat-
eral trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable
share; investment contract; voting trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a
security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or
lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof); or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a na-
tional securities exchange relating to foreign currency; any beneficial interest
or other security issued in connection with a funded employees' pension, profit
sharing, stock bonus, or similar benefit plan; or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. All of the
foregoing are securities whether or not evidenced by written document.
54. The "investment contract" listed in Corporations Code section 25019 has
been touted as a means by which limited partnership interests can be termed securities.
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rent California case law holds that they may be considered
securities.5
In People v. Graham"6 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ex-
plained the tests to determine securities status of limited partnership
interests and the circumstances under which such interests should be
considered securities. The two approaches to determine the existence
of a security interest are the Howey test,57 and the "risk capital"
test.58
In SEC v. Howey Company, the United States Supreme Court
held that an investment contract59 meant a "contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party ... ."60 The elements for determining whether an in-
terest is a security under Howey are: (a) a party invests money; (b)
Comment, supra note I, at 621. Because "investment contract" is so broad, one court
has stated that simply analyzing whether the interest is a security without diving into the
"investment contract" issue would be equally correct and less confusing. People v. Gra-
ham, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 1165 n.4, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322 (1985).
Like California law, the federal Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 do not include limited partnerships in their definitions of "security." The "invest-
ment contract," "certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement,"
and "any instrument commonly known as a 'security'" are concepts used to bring limited
partnership interests under the federal securities law. T. LYNN & H. GOLDBERG. REAL
ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 178 (2d ed. 1983). See also Real Estate Syndications,
Securities Act Release No. 4,877, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (Aug. 8, 1967) (interests in real
estate limited partnerships in District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia constitute
investment contracts, hence securities).
55. See, e.g. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1165, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322. One
commentator simply states that limited partnership interests are securities by definition
where "the investor does not have any right to control the operation of the business and
cannot be given such right without destroying his status as a limited partner. . . ." I H.
MARSH & R. VOLK. PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS § 5.11(2)
(1986). See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 253; T. LYNN & H.
GOLDBERG, supra note 54, at 179.
Graham is addressed in a recent discussion of the securities status of limited partner-
ship interests. Comment, supra note 15, at 125. The Comment discusses in detail Cali-
fornia's version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA). Id. at 126-
27. It argues that limited partnership interests may not always be securities under Cali-
fornia law because of the RULPA's provision for enhanced limited partner "control" in
various settings. Id. at 157-59. It concludes, however, that most limited partnership in-
terests "should be treated as securities .. " That proposition does not contradict the
position taken in the instant Comment. For all practical purposes, limited partnership
interests will be treated as securities in California, even under the RULPA. See, e.g.
notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
56. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318.
57. The test was defined in SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
58. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1167, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The approach
originated in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
59. See supra note 54.
60. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99; see also Syde, 37 Cal. 2d at 768, 235 P.2d at
603; Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1165, 2310 Cal. Rptr. at 322; 2 BALLANTINE &
STERLING, supra note 9, at § 444.02 (examining California treatment of Howey test).
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in a common enterprise; (c) expecting profit; (d) from others' efforts
alone. The phrase "solely from the efforts [of others]" has led to
criticism of the case for the language's ambiguity.61 Some courts
have interpreted the words literally. They find that any participation
whatsoever by an investor takes the interest out of the securities
realm.62
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the Howey test
more liberally in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises.6 3 The court
stated that the crucial efforts made by others are "those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise." 64 Graham agreed with Glenn W. Turner that the "no con-
trol" element of Howey should be defined broadly.
6 5
Although the Graham court did not use the Howey test, other
California courts have followed it.66 The Howey test applies to lim-
ited partnerships when limited partners invest money in the limited
partnership, which satisfies the first two elements, investing money in
a common enterprise. The third element, expectation of profit, gener-
ally is satisfiable, but it may pose a problem if the investment is for a
tax shelter.6 7 The fourth element, no control on the investors' part,
may prove difficult to fulfill in some cases if its strict definition is
used, but usually it does not create difficulty because of the generally
passive nature of limited partnership interests. Indeed, courts have
held that limited partnerships can and do satisfy the Howey test."8
Graham applied the risk capital test instead of the Howey test. 9
61. Comment, supra note 1, at 622.
62. See, e.g., Bruner v. State, 463 S.W. 2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Georgia
Mkt. Centers v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E. 2d 620 (1969).
63. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) (commonly cited as Glenn W. Turner).
64. Id. at 482.
65. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1168-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
66. People v. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d 719, 201 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1984); People v.
Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1978); see also 2 BALLANTINE & STER-
LING, supra note 69, at § 444.02.
67. The problem is addressed more thoroughly in Comment, supra note 1, at 629
n.56.
68. McGreghar Land Co. v. Megiuar, 521 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); accord
Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kroungold v. Treister,
407 F. Supp. 414, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (real estate limited partnerships).
69. The Graham court stated that it would not decide whether the risk capital
test was the exclusive California test or whether Howey and the risk capital test were
alternatives. California explicitly adopted the Howey test in People v. Park, 87 Cal. App.
3d 550, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1978) and also applied the risk capital test, for example, in
Graham. It thus appears that the two tests are alternatives, although the Graham court
inferred that the risk capital test may be predominant. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at
1166-67, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
1195
The risk capital test's key element is that third parties provide risk
capital in a venture for profit." The investor need not expect any
pecuniary profit,71 unlike under Howey's profit expectation require-
ment. Risk of business capital is not the only element of the test,
however.7 2 Graham effectively merged Howey with the risk capital
approach by adding the element of lack of managerial control (the
broad Glenn W. Turner definition) over the venture.7  Graham held
that the limited partnership interest involved was a security because
a third party investor risked capital in a common venture, and be-
cause a limited partnership - by definition - precludes investor
participation in essential managerial efforts. 4
Graham is important in two respects. First, it stands for the pro-
position that a limited partnership interest can be, and generally is, a
security.7 5 Its position is shared by cases,"6 commentators7 7 and prac-
titioners.7 8 It directly contradicts Dahlquist's theory that limited
partnership interests are not securities. Second, Graham indicates
that active participation7 9 in a limited partnership, which Dahlquist
asserts as a key ingredient in determining securities status, 0 is pre-
cluded by definition.
Because limited partnership interests can be and often are securi-
ties, Dahlquist's theory is essentially obsolete. Thus, Rivlin and
Sherman based their discussion of mutual selection on an outdated
conception of limited partnership law. Moreover, Rivlin and Sher-
man misinterpreted that obsolete theory to say something it did not
say.8'
70. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1167, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324; Silver Hills Coun-
try Club, 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
71. Silver Hills Country Club, 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
72. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1167, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
73. Id. at 1168, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court found the passive investor re-
quirement "implicit in the risk capital test ... " Id. (citing SEC v. Koscot Int'l Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974)).
74. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1168-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25. Under the
pre-RULPA Corporations Code, a limited partner effectively became a general partner if
he exercised managerial control beyond: (a) voting for election or removal of general
partners; (b) terminating the partnership; (c) amending the partnership agreement; or
(d) similar powers. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (Deering 1979). See CAL. CORP. CODE §
15632(a) (Deering Supp. 1987); see also supra note 4.
75. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1164-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 321-26.
76. People v. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d 719, 201 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1984); People v.
Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1978); see also supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text.
77. I H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 55; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra
note 10; Comment, supra note 1, at 628-30.
78. See, e.g., T. LYNN & H. GOLDBERG, supra note 54, at 178-79.
79. "Active participation" includes active selection of partners for admission into
the partnership. See infra text accompanying note 93.
80. Dahlquist, supra note 27, at 362-63.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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MUTUAL SELECTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH BONA FIDE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS: People v. Feno
In People v. Feno,82 the Fourth District Court of Appeal persua-
sively reasoned that a bona fide limited partnership represented pas-
sive interests, and that mutual selection is inconsistent with passive
interests. Feno was an appeal from a criminal conviction for offering
securities in violation of Corporations Code section 25110.83
Feno owned a used car business. He had (he thought) a bright
idea. He solicited investors to enable him to buy used cars at auc-
tions, recondition the cars, and sell them for a profit, which he would
share with the investors. He advertised in the newspaper and drew
several people into his scheme. The arrangement did not succeed and
Feno managed to repay only one of the original investors. A jury
convicted Feno of violating Corporations Code section 25110.84
Feno tried to show that the interests were exempt from qualifica-
tion as a private offering under Corporations Code section
25102().85 The court delved into an analysis of section 25102(f)
which bears upon the issue of mutual selection.
The Feno court noted that section 25102(f) involves "non-public
offerings of certain types of securities,"86 including bona fide limited
partnership interests.8 7 The court referred to the distinguishing char-
acteristic of a security: "whether the interest represents a passive in-
vestment or an active participation in the venture on the part of the
interest holder."'88 Joint venture interests representing passive invest-
82. 154 Cal. App. 3d 719, 201 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1984).
83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110; see also supra note 18.
84. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 723-24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
85. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f); see supra note 23. Former section 25102(0
was replaced by the current section 25102(f) in 1981. The new section is somewhat
broader in that it does not specifically exempt general partnership, joint venture or lim-
ited partnership private offerings and certain trusts. Rather, it sets specific statutory cri-
teria for exemption. Paraphrased, the criteria are:
(1) The sale must be made to no more than 35 persons;
(2) Purchasers must have preexisting personal or business relationship with offerors, or
have other criteria evidencing their capacity to protect their own interests;
(3) Purchasers are buying only for their own accounts, or for a trust; and
(4) The offering is not advertised.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (Deering Supp. 1987).
Despite the amendment to section 25102(f), Feno's discussion of the former rule is
pertinent because of its analysis of what a "bona fide partnership" means. Further, Sher-
man was based on the former rule; Rivlin and Solomont were based on the rule's
predecessors.
86. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.
87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (Deering 1979).
88. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 516. Feno implicitly
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ments are securities and thus exempt if offered and sold privately
under section 25102(f). Interests involving active participation are
not securities89 (as Graham states) 90 and thus outside the scope of
securities laws.
The Feno court had to ascertain the meaning of "bona fide" in
section 25102(f) before deciding whether the section applied to
Feno's arrangement and exempted the venture from qualification.
The court admittedly was puzzled by the use of "bona fide" in sec-
tion 25102(f).91 The problem the court found was whether a "bona
fide" interest, for example, a limited partnership interest, repre-
sented an active or a passive interest.
92
The question is central to the Rivlin problem. Rivlin found mutual
selection a requirement for a bona fide limited partnership under
section 25102(f)'s predecessor. Feno noted that delectus personae,
mutual selection, is consistent with active participation in and con-
trol of the venture.93 Thus, in essence, Rivlin found that a bona fide
limited partnership was one in which the investors actively partici-
pated. As such, the limited partnership would fall under the statu-
tory exemption. 4
However, Feno pointed out that if an interest represents active
participation, it is not even a security. It needs no exemption from
securities laws. If a "bona fide" interest is an active interest, section
25102(f) is internally contradictory in that it provides an exemption
from securities laws for an interest which is not a security.95 The
entire section would be meaningless and superfluous. Yet the con-
struction Rivlin gives to "bona fide" produces such a result.
A more appropriate construction, one that gives meaning to sec-
tion 25102(f), is that "bona fide" interests represent passive inter-
ests. As passive interests, limited partnership interests are securi-
ties96 and certain private offerings of those securities find exemption
under 25102(f). Despite their. passive nature, they are nonetheless
"bona fide," true limited partnership interests. Feno adopts this con-
adopted the Howey test at this point.
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 66-80.
91. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17. Dahlquist probably
used the words "bona fide limited partnership" in his article in contrast to "sham" part-
nerships. According to Richard W. Jennings, Coffroth Professor of Law, Emeritus at
U.C. Berkeley and a member of the advisory committee for the 1968 Corporate Securi-
ties law, the draftsman of the 1968 law likely incorporated "bona fide" in section
25102(0 with Dahlquist's article in mind; i.e., "bona fide" meant the opposite of
"sham." Letter from Richard W. Jennings to Homer Kripke, supra note 38.
92. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
93. Id. at 726 n.4, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.4.
94. Id. at 726, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
95. Id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 53-81.
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struction, noting that the idea that "bona fide" represents active in-
terests simply "makes no sense."9
Thus, Rivlin's and Sherman's finding that bona fide limited part-
nerships require mutual selection renders an exemption for bona fide
limited partnerships meaningless. Feno's adoption of an opposite
construction both avoids negating the meaning of 25102(f) and af-
firms that a true limited partnership interest is a passive interest,
lacking mutual selection. Feno's view is the most satisfactory. It il-
lustrates the illogic of requiring mutual selection in formation of lim-
ited partnerships.
CONCLUSION
The weight of evidence opposes mutual selection as a requirement
for a limited partnership's bona fide existence. The Corporations
Code recognizes that a limited partnership is formed upon compli-
ance with statutory requirements" which do not include mutual se-
lection, contrary to Rivlin's doctrine.99 It recognizes the partner-
ship's right to add limited partners without the other limited
partners' consent, if the partnership agreement so provides.100 And,
97. Feno, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
98. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15621 (Deering Supp. 1987).
99. Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961); Solomont v.
Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 497, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22,28 (1966). Solomont applied
Rivlin and stated that mutual selection is a prerequisite to limited partnership formation.
Solomont quoted a commentator's statement that mutual selection is necessary at for-
mation of the limited partnership. Solomont took that statement quite out of context.
The statement was made in the course of a discussion of general partnerships alone. See
I S. ROWLEY. PARTNERSHIP 499-500 (2d ed. 1960). Rowley's statement is valid with
respect to general partnerships. The discussion of limited partnerships in the accompany-
ing volume makes no mention of delectus personae as a requirement for the formation of
limited partnerships. 2 S. ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP 549-601 (2d ed. 1960). See also supra
note 15.
100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15631(a)(1) (set out supra note I1). See also supra note
8. The partnership agreement can provide for admission of additional limited partners
without the other limited partners' consent. Two simple provisions from real estate lim-
ited partnership agreements illustrate this. First, the American Property Investors VII
Limited Partnership Agreement, art. XVI, § A, an offering of 60,000 limited partnership
units dated May 16, 1977, provides: "The Certificate of Limited Partnership of the Part-
nership shall be amended without additional consent of Limited Partners when: . . . 3.
An additional Limited Partner is admitted." D. AUGUSTINE & P. FASS, REAL ESTATE
SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 9, 124 (1978)).
The second example, the University Real Estate Investors Amended Limited Partner-
ship Agreement, § 6.4, an offering of 15,000 limited partnership units dated July 23,
1979, provides under the subheading: "Consents of Limited Partners:" "By executing or
adopting this Partnership agreement, each Limited Partner hereby consents to the admis-
sion of additional or substituted Limited Partners by the General Partners and to any
Assignee of his Partnership Units becoming a substituted Limited Partner." D. AUGUS-
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as one observer of the situation has noted, no doubt the Commis-
sioner of Corporations would not have permitted the "vast number of
sales" of public limited partnership interests in California if such
partnerships had no true existence.101
The analysis that limited partnership interests are securities de-
stroys the mutual selection doctrine's theoretical basis. Dahlquist's
obsolete view of the essence of a true limited partnership fails to
accord with contemporary law and practice. 102 And Feno's analysis
of section 25102(f0, placing mutual selection into the active partici-
pation category, illustrates the illogic of mutual selection as a re-
quirement for limited partnership.
103
The mutual, selection doctrine advanced by Sherman, Solomont,
and Rivlin in California's second appellate district reflects an unreal-
istic view of limited partnership law. If the doctrine is followed, the
potential exists for finding no limited partnership ever existed where
all the parties believed, and the law indicated, it did exist. Disgrun-
tled investors might use the doctrine as a ploy to recoup lost invest-
ments. The rights of parties could be drastically confused. Attorneys
would be hard-pressed to reconcile the doctrine with the realities of
large limited partnerships.
But Sherman and its doctrine need not, indeed should not, be fol-
lowed. The doctrine is not now, nor ever was, accepted law in Cali-
fornia. 0 Better means of determining the existence of a partnership
are available. For example, failure to comply with statutory forma-
tion requirements, fraud, or failure to qualify the interests as securi-
ties should be used where appropriate.
Where the statutory requirements have been met, California
courts should affirm the bona fide existence of limited partnerships,
despite the members' lack of unanimous consent to each other's ad-
mission into the partnership. Sherman v. Lloyd, Solomont v. Polk
Development Company and Rivlin v. Levine should be overruled.
GEORGE M. MEANS
TINE & P. FASS. PUBLIC REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1980. at 110 (1980).
101. Homer Kripke, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Pro-
fessor of Law Emeritus, New York University. Letter from Homer Kripke to Marshall
Rich (July 24, 1986) (discussing Sherman v. Lloyd) (on file with San Diego Law
Review).
102. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
104. With the exception of the Second District in Solomont and Sherman, no
court has followed Rivlin's mutual selection doctrine.
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